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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Cruise Ship Ticket
(continued from page 29)

able and stated that, absent any
fraud or undue influence, a forum
selection clause was valid. After
analyzing the Ninth Circuit's application of The Bremen, the Court
concluded that the lower court had
ignored important differences in a
contract between businesses and a
contract between a consumer and a
business.
The Court began by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a
non-negotiated forum selection
clause was never enforceable because it was not the subject of
bargaining. Instead, the Court stated that this particular clause was
permissible for several reasons.
First, because of the likelihood that
its passengers would be from many
locales, Carnival had a special interest in limiting the geographical
locations of courts in which it
potentially could be sued. Second,
the clause establishing the forum
for any future litigation had the
beneficial effect of dispelling any
confusion about where the dispute
must be brought and defended.
This certainty spared time, expense, and judicial resources. Finally, the Court reasoned that
when the cruise line limited the
courts in which it could be sued, it
saved money which was passed on
to the passengers in the form of
reduced fares.
Next, the Court addressed the
Shutes' assertion that litigating
their claim in Florida would be
inconvenient. The Court noted
that here, as in The Bremen, the
party claiming inconvenience had
a heavy burden of proof. Using this
standard, the Court found that the
Shutes did not meet the burden
needed to set aside a forum selection clause on the grounds of inconvenience. Since the district
court made no findings of fact
regarding physical and financial
impediments derived from litigation in Florida, the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion of inconvenience had
no basis in the record and, therefore, was not valid.
The Court also found that the
Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the
statement in The Bremen that, "the
serious inconvenience of the con30

tractual forum to one or both of the
parties might carry greater weight
in determining the reasonableness
of the forum clause." 407 U.S. at
17. The Court noted that this statement contemplated a hypothetical
agreement between two Americans
to resolve their local disputes in a
remote, alien forum. In the instant
case, however, Florida was not a
remote forum nor was the dispute
an essentially local one, since Mrs.
Shute was injured in international
waters. Therefore, the litigation
was not inherently more suited to
resolution in the state of Washington than Florida.
The Court then determined that
the forum selection clause was fair;
it found no evidence that Carnival
selected Florida as the forum in an
attempt to discourage passengers
from pursuing legitimate claims.
The Court based this conclusion
on the facts that Carnival's principal place of business was Florida
and that many of its cruises departed from and returned to Florida
ports. Similarly, the Court found
no evidence indicating that Carnival obtained the passengers' approval of the forum selection
clause by fraud.
Finally, the Court addressed the
Shutes' contention that enforcement of the clause violated 46
U.S.C. App. 183c, which proscribes a right to trial by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The forum
selection clause, the Court noted,
specifically designated that all actions be brought in a Florida court.
Since Florida courts are courts of
competent jurisdiction, no violation of 46 U.S.C. App. 183c existed.
The Dissenting Opinion
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Stevens and Marshall concluded that the forum selection
clause should not be enforceable
since passengers did not have notice of the clause until after they
purchased the tickets. Further, the
dissenters concluded that, even if
the passengers had received prominent notice of the forum selection
clause before they committed to
the cost of the cruise, the clause
was void under The Limitation of
Vessel Owners Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. App. 183C, which invali-

dates express limitations on a shipowner's liability for negligence.
Further, traditional admiralty law
prohibits exculpatory clauses in
passenger tickets because they are
typically the product of disparate
bargaining power between the carrier and the passenger and undermine the strong public interest in
deterring negligent conduct.
Kathrine Schmitt Hilder

Expert Testimony
Required To Prove
Negligent Approval of
Fraudulent Credit Card
Application
In Beard, et aL v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Company, et al., 587 A.2d
195 (D.C. 1991), the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held
that, due to lack of expert testimony as to the standard of care in the
retail industry, a consumer had
failed to show negligence on the
part of merchants approving unauthorized credit card applications in
his name. The court further found
that the consumer had no cause of
action under consumer protection
regulations requiring retail sellers
to register with the Office of Consumer Protection because no actual injury occurred.
Background
Ms. Roberts ("Roberts"), a former girlfriend of Eugene Beard
("Beard"), applied for and obtained credit cards in his name
from several department stores.
The department store companies
included May Department Stores,
Inc. ("Hecht's"), Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., and Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. among others.
This case began as a debt collection suit brought by Hecht's
against both Beard and Roberts.
Beard counterclaimed against
Hecht's and the other department
stores that issued fraudulent credit
cards in his name, or jointly in his
and Roberts' names. He argued
that the cards had been issued
negligently without verification of
the application information. Beard
claimed no knowledge of or conVolume 4 Number 1/Fall, 1991
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sent to the cards' issuances. Beard
also alleged that the reporting of
the balances due on the cards to
CBI, a credit reporting company,
caused his credit rating to suffer
substantially. These claims are referred to as Beard I.
Additionally, Beard, together
with another consumer, brought a
second suit against several of the
stores involved in Beard I. Beard
alleged that, because the companies had failed to register as retail
creditors, they had not complied
with the District of Columbia Consumer Retail Credit Regulations,
16 D.C. Mun. Regs. 102.1 (1987).
This claim is referred to as Beard
II. The two cases were consolidated on appeal.
No Evidence of Negligence
The trial court, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia,
granted the merchants' summary
judgment motion in Beard I. Beard
appealed, claiming negligence on
the part of the companies in accepting fraudulent credit applications and reporting detrimental
credit information pertaining to
the balances owed on the accounts.
Beard claimed that the merchants' negligence was proven by
their failure to exercise due care in
verifying the application information. He argued that if the merchants had exercised proper due
care, the credit cards would not
have been issued and, therefore,
the injury to his credit rating would
have been avoided. He also
claimed the merchants were negligent in failing to adhere to their
own application review process.
In the appellate court, the merchants again filed a motion for
summary judgment on the basis
that there was no evidence of negligence. Relying on affidavits describing their processing procedures, the merchants argued that
their guidelines had been followed
in Beard's case, and therefore, due
care had been exercised. Several of
the merchants claimed that their
credit application review procedures were standard in the retail
industry.
Beard submitted an investigator's affidavit stating the merchants had failed to contact
Beard's employer to verify the apVolume 4 Number 1/Fall, 1991

plication information. However,
Beard failed to submit any expert
affidavits demonstrating the standard of care applicable to the merchants, nor did he define such a
standard by any other method.
The appellate court held that
while the affidavits submitted by
the merchants were relevant to
proving due care, a mere showing
that their procedures conformed
with industry custom was not
enough to support a summary
judgment motion. Rather, the
court held that summary judgment
must be granted due to Beard's
failure to submit expert testimony
demonstrating the merchants' negligence.
The court held that, in general,
where the subject matter is beyond
the knowledge and understanding
of the average person, expert testimony is necessary in order for
plaintiffs to prove negligence. The
court then explained that the general public is not aware of the
available methods for detecting application fraud, nor how much the
adoption of such methods would
ultimately cost the merchants' customers. Therefore, the court held
that the proper standard of care to
be used by merchants in the processing of retail credit card applications was beyond the knowledge of
the average juror, and Beard needed expert testimony to establish
negligence.
Beard's allegation that the merchants failed to adhere to their own
procedures for processing applications was also rejected. Beard had
submitted affidavits and exhibits
showing the inaccuracies of some
of the information on the applications, such as incorrect social security numbers, salary figures, and
address listings. The court found,
however, that such inaccuracies
could not be detected from the face
of the applications and that Beard
failed to prove a duty of further
inquiry. Consequently, the court
held that Beard had failed to present any issue of fact for trial
regarding evidence of the merchants' negligence.
Consumer Regulations Do Not
Apply
In Beard II, the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia granted

summary judgment in favor of the
merchants. Beard appealed on the
grounds that several of the merchants failed to comply with 16
D.C. Mun. Regs. 102.1 (1984),
which requires all retail sellers to
register with the Office of Consumer Protection. Beard claimed that
as a result of their failure to register, the merchants must return all
money paid to them for goods
purchased during the non-registration period.
The appellate court rejected
Beard's registration argument for
two reasons. First, the regulation
provided several means of enforcement, none of which allow for a
private party to bring a civil action.
The court held that the regulation
was intended to be enforced by
public officials or through privately instigated administrative proceedings.
Further, the appellate court did
not recognize the remedies Beard
demanded. The regulation intended relatively small penal sanctions,
such as fines of up to $300 or
imprisonment for no more than 10
days. The court rejected the argument that the regulation had intended to allow for drastic forfeitures. Due to its penal nature, the
law was to be strictly construed
and could not support such forfeiture by implication.
Beard admitted to having suffered no injury as a direct result of
the merchants' failure to register
according to 16 D.C. Mun. Regs.
102.1. The legislation from which
the regulation stemmed only provided protection and relief to consumers who had suffered actual
injury. The court held that injury
was a condition precedent to suit
under the regulation and thus
barred Beard's claim. The court
upheld the grant of summary judgment.
Gwen M. Geraghty

Wyoming Extends
Warranty Of Habitability
To Minor Construction
Defects
In Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273
(Wyo. 1990), the Supreme Court of
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